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Withering Away, Weakly
F.A. Muller
Abstract. One of the reasons provided for the shift away from an ontology
for physical reality of material objects & properties towards one of physi-
cal structures & relations (Ontological Structural Realism: OntSR) is that
the quantum-mechanical description of composite physical systems of sim-
ilar elementary particles entails they are indiscernible. As material objects,
they ‘whither away’, andwhen they wither away, structures emerge in their
stead. We inquire into the question whether recent results establishing the
weak discernibility of elementary particles pose a threat for this quantum-
mechanical reason for OntSR, because precisely their newly discovered dis-
cernibility prevents them from ‘whithering away’. We argue there is a
straightforward manner to consider the recent results as a reason in favour
of OntSR rather than against it.
Contents
1 Whither Elementary Particles? 1
2 Scientific Structural Realism 3
3 Weak Discernibles 6
4 The Second Underdetermination Thesis 7
Notes 10
References 12
1 Whither Elementary Particles?
According to our best scientifically informed philosophical views, everything in the
universe, from the body of Albert Einstein to the brain of Angelina Jolie and from the
music of Friedrich Nietzsche to the ideas of Igor Strawinsky, ultimately either consists
of or supervenes on pieces of interacting matter. Without interactingmatter there would
be nothing, perhaps not even space-time. According to our best scientific theories,
every piece of interacting matter in the universe is composed of elementary particles,
ultimately quarks, leptons and gauge bosons. Hence everything in the universe ulti-
mately either consist of or supervenes on elementary particles. This makes elementary
particles truly and uniquely fundamental.
According to quantum mechanics (QM), elementary particles are unlike tiny indi-
visible pieces of rigid matter in motion, occupying a definite location at every instant
of time, colliding with other particles. This much is pretty certain. In good Popperian
spirit, we know what an elementary particle is not.
But, then, what are elementary particles? What are they like? We want to know this.
QM tells us more, if only a little: elementary particles possess some properties,
such as mass, charge and magnitude of spin. All other properties are however denied
to them, unless we perform measurements on them. Just after measurements are per-
formed on them, in the laboratory, they acquire some additional properties. But only
for a split second. After measurements have ended, the properties pop out of existence
again. And they pop back into existence upon measurement and only upon measure-
ment, unpredictably. Elementary particles are somewhat like colourless, amorphous
entities in a box that obtain a shining colour and assume a definite shape as soon as
someone opens the box. Sheer magic. Realmagic.
Elementary particles never occupy any definite location. They are neither some-
where nor everywhere. Yet there is a non-vanishing probability to find them anywhere
upon measurement, also outside boxes with the thickest of walls, just after you put
them in there and closed the box firmly. Elementary particles behave as if they were
tiny billiard balls in some respects when they find themselves in certain particular
circumstances, created by us; and they behave as if they were tiny waves in some re-
spects when they find themselves in other particular circumstances, also created by us.
This is called ‘the wave-particle duality’. But, as Feynman knew, to introduce a word
for something does not mean you understand it. They are like little schizophrenics it
seems. The proposal to call them ‘wavicles’ rather than ‘particles’ to express this has
not caught on, as have Nicholas Maxwell’s proposal to call them ‘propensitons’ and
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Le´vy-Leblond’s to call them ‘quantons’. Admittedly naming is not the same as un-
derstanding, but a different word just to signal that the quantum-mechanical particle-
concept is very unlike the classical particle-concept we once knew, used and loved is a
commendable idea.
When sets of what Dirac called similar elementary particles are considered (i.e. hav-
ing the same few properties they do possess), they loose their individuality, as a con-
sequence of the symmetrisation postulate of QM, according to which permuting them
does not yield a situation that is physically discernible from the unpermuted one. Ever
since Weyl (1928) brought it up about eighty years ago and Margenau (1949) empha-
sised it about twenty years later, philosophers of physics have been arguing that this
means that QM refutes Leibniz’s venerable principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII);
for when we can have composite physical systems consisting of indiscernible particles,
PII is refuted because PII precisely forbids the existence of such indiscernible objects.
So elementary particles are indiscernibles, precisely as Schro¨dinger has begged us to be-
lieve.1 After having taken cognizance of this, Quine overreacted by concluding that
“matter evidently goes by the board”.2
Whenwe take Einstein’s insights into the nature of space and time into account, and
wed QM to his Special Theory of Relativity by cutting away infinities that arise in the
process (renormalisation), particles no longer live eternally. They can be annihilated
and created. We can do it and we do it, in what Casimir has called ‘the cathedrals of the
20th Century’: the high-energy particle accelerators that have the size of cities, those
magnificent symbols of our pursuit to unravel the mysteries of the cosmos. By the
way, the effect named after Casimir showed that quantum-physical empty space (the
vacuum), i.e. without ‘particles’, is not a void but a plenum, seething with fluctuations;
when you accelerate a ‘particle-detector’ through empty space, it registers something,
as Unruh first demonstrated — presumably it detects so-called Rindler quanta.3 Long
before talk of virtual reality became common, virtual elementary particles swarmed the
stage of physics, in a limbo between definite existence and definite non-existence that
still no one understands. And when elementary particles are localised somewhere, in
space, at some point in time, upon measurement in a laboratory, they are not localised
anywhere according to someone who happens to drive by the laboratory on her bicy-
cle — for localisation is not Lorentz-invariant, as Wigner pointed out long ago. Baf-
flingly, a quantum theory of localisable particles in Minkowski space-time turns out to
be mathematically impossible altogether, as Malament demonstrated.4 The marriage
between QM and the Special Theory of Relativity seems the death-knell of the already
meagre quantum-mechanical concept of a particle.
2
If these quantum-physical considerations do not make a case for a drastic revision
of our fundamental ontology of material objects with properties, then we may safely
predict that nothing will ever make such a case.5 At the truly and uniquely funda-
mental level of physical reality, there are no individual material objects with proper-
ties and relations that derive from properties. There are no individuals. There are no
absolute discernibles. Let’s face it, indiscernible objects are no objects at all. Identity
conditions break down. No identity, no entity. Quantification breaks down. We can
talk no more — and if someone wants to keep talking of physical objects nonetheless,
then he must kiss standard mathematics and classical logic goodbye, must embrace an
entirely different set-theory and logic, as Dalla Chiara, Di Franca, French and others
have known for a while.6
All in all, elementary particles as material objects whither away. For whom science
matters, everything must go. What will replace them?
Enter ontological structural realism. Elementary particles are structures. At the truly
and uniquely fundamental level of physical reality there are only structures. Structures
drive on relations. If structures have properties, these properties derive from relations.
‘Particles’ are no more than placeholders in structures. They don’t really exist. Only
structures exist. Schro¨dinger: “Some philosophers of the past, if the case could be put
to them, would say that the modern atom consists of no stuff at all but is pure shape.”7
So the ontological structural realist lives happily ever after? Not so fast. Recently
his happiness has come under threat. But before we expound the threat (Section 3) and
try to allay it (Section 4), we first need to get clear on the relation between scientific
realism and the metaphysical thesis of ontological structural realism, which we just
introduced in passing (Section 2).
2 Scientific Structural Realism
When J. Ladyman introduced the distinction between Epistemological Structural Realism
(EpSR) and Ontological Structural Realism (OntSR), and argued for OntSR, he called
quantummechanics (QM) to the witness-bench; other structural realists have endorsed
this strategy, notably S. French.8 We briefly inquire into their relation to the general
view of scientific realism, arguably still the dominant position in the realism debate in
the philosophy of science. Here is a standard formulation of scientific realism.
Scientific Realism (ScR). Most of the posits of our theoretical scientific knowledge (objects,
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fields, structures, events, processes), unobservable ones notably included, exist human-independently
in the actual world; these posits possess human-independently most of the properties ascribed
them by our theoretical scientific knowledge, and mutatis mutandis for the relations between
them.
By ‘theoretical scientific knowledge’ we mean the propositional content of all well-
established scientific theories andmodels.9 The presence of the adverb ‘human-independently’
serves to emphasise that scientific realism (ScR), being realism with regard to science,
stands opposed to idealism. Whatever posits with their properties and relations that
the realist claims there are, they are there independent of our existence and our activ-
ities and whatever else comes along with that. The mentioning of unobservables in
ScR merely serves to emphasise that they (or most of them) are included: ‘Most’ in ScR
does not mean a restriction to observables only.10 Furthermore, the occurrence of ‘the
actual world’ signals explicitly that ScR, as formulated here, does not is not comprise
modal claims.
Roughly summarised, ScR says that science provides us with knowledge of the ac-
tual world. A more restrictive and therefore more modest realist claim is the following
one:
Scientific Epistemological Structural Realism (ScEpSR). All our theoretical scientific
knowledge of the actual physical world is knowledge of its structures.
The restriction is two-fold: to structures and to the physicalworld. The last-mentioned
restriction leaves room formental reality; it leaves room for a reduction of themental to
the physical, for supervenience of the mental on the physical, and even for a Cartesian
substance dualism. ScEpSR makes no pronouncements on mentality and does not har-
bour any kind of (anti-)physicalism. For instance, the existence of mental non-structural
entities is compatible with ScEpSR.
Further, debates on and elaborations of structural realism generally have been fo-
cussing on physics, and not, for instance, on paleontology, zoology or astronomy,
to mention a few branches of natural science only. This is understandable, because
ScEpSR was intended by its modern originator, J. Worrall, as being ‘the best of both
worlds’, in that it was supposed to be a metaphysically meagre realism so as not to
fall prey to the pessimistic meta-induction over the history of science, but still a suf-
ficiently muscular realism to provide success-arguments in its defence (e.g. Putnam’s
‘no-miracle argument’).11 Since the pessimistic meta-induction thrives on the history
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of physics, rather than on the history of paleontology, zoology or astronomy, the debate
has therefore focussed on physics. We soon join in.
When knowledge implies truth, as few epistemologists would care to deny, then
ScEpSR implies that all and only propositions of our theoretical scientific knowledge
that concern structures are true. Hence the physical world consists of structures, which
exist human-independently because science does not connect the relevant existence-
claims to our existence or our activities — this is almost but not yet ontological struc-
tural realism (read on). Does the physical world consist only of structures? Let us also
adopt
Scientific Optimism (ScOpt). Science will, in the end, provide us with everything that
we, humans, can come to know about the physical world.
When ScEpSR implies that the physical world consists of structures, then in combi-
nation with ScOpt we arrive at
Ontological Structural Realism (OntSR). The physical world consists of structures only
and they exist human-independently.
Conversely, if structures are all there is in the physical world (OntSR), then all we
can come to know of the physical world by scientific inquiry is knowledge of struc-
tures. All theoretical scientific knowledge that we actually posses then must be know-
ledge of structures only; this is ScEpSR.
To summarise, we have just argued for the following
(ScOpt ∧ ScEpSR) −→ OntSR and OntSR −→ ScEpSR , (1)
from which it follows that for scientific optimists the difference between OntSR and
ScEpSR is of little significance:
ScOpt −→ (OntSR ←→ ScEpSR) . (2)
Hence debates amongst optimistic scientific realists whether an ontological or an
epistemological variant of ScR should be adopted are without substance. Substance
would return if ScOpt were rejected, but even then adherence to OntSR would still im-
ply adherence to ScEpSR. Only ScEpSR would then no longer imply OntSR, although
also in that case it would follow that the physical world consists of structures as far as
science can tell, but that, then, there is be more between heaven and earth than dreamt
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of in science and what is beyond these dreams and inhabits the physical world may
be non-structural in nature. Whether such a rejection of ScOpt is scientific pessimism
or anti-scientific obscurantism is an issue we need not decide for the purposes of the
current paper.
Recall that the conclusion of the previous Section was that quantum physics, which
is part of our theoretical scientific knowledge, is telling us that elementary particles are
not material objects but structures. This is ScEpSR; and for the scientific optimist we
then have OntSR by virtue of (1). But at the end of the previous Section we also men-
tioned a threat to the claim that elementary particles are not material objects, which eo
ipso constitutes a threat to both ScEpSR and OntSR. We now turn to the source of this
threat.
3 Weak Discernibles
Recently it has been argued that similar particles can be saved from indiscernibility.12
They can be discerned by physically meaningful binary relations that are permutation-
invariant; that is, by relations that are symmetric and either irreflexive or reflexive. This
makes the particles weakly discernible, to follow Quine’s terminology.13 What is more,
these relations are categorical in that they do not involve the quantum-mechanical prob-
abilities. Call an object (in a set S of objects) that is absolutely discernible—meaning that
it has a property that no other object in S has — an individual (so that its ‘individuality’
resides in that property); call an object that is relationally discernible — meaning that it
is discerned from all other objects in S by a relation — but not absolutely discernible a
relational; and call an object that is neither an individual nor a relational indiscernible.14
Then elementary particles are not indiscernibles but relationals. We provide two ex-
amples of this and refer to the relevant literature for the general theorems.
Example 1. Consider a composite physical system of two fermions having spin }/2
and finite-dimensional Hilbert-space H = C2; then C2 ⊗ C2 is the pure state space of
the composite system. We have a set {1, 2} of two particles, having names (or labels) ‘1’
and ‘2’, over which the particle-variables a and b run. There is only a single admissible
pure state (and therefore there are no admissible mixed states), which is (the unit ray
of) the celebrated anti-symmetric singlet-state:
|Ψ〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|z+〉 ⊗ |z−〉 − |z−〉 ⊗ |z+〉) ∈ C2 ⊗C2 . (3)
Consider the following physically meaningful and permutation-symmetric ‘Total-spin
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relation’ (in units of }2/2):
T(a, b) iff
(
σa + σb
)2 |Ψ〉 = 12 |Ψ〉 , (4)
where
σ1 ≡ (σx + σy + σz)⊗ 1 and σ2 ≡ 1 ⊗ (σx + σy + σz) , (5)
and where σx, σy and σz are the Pauli spin-matrices. Relation T (4) demonstrably dis-
cerns the two fermions weakly and categorically.15
Example 2. Consider a composite system of two arbitrary similar spinless particles
and infinite-dimensional Hilbert-space H = L2(R3). Let P̂ be the linear momentum
operator and Q̂ the Cartesian position-operator acting in L2(R3). Consider the follow-
ing physically meaningful and permutation-invariant ‘commutator-relation’:
C(a, b) iff ∀Φ ∈ D : [P̂a, Q̂b]Φ = −i}Φ , (6)
where D ⊆ L2(R3)⊗ L2(R3) is the domain of the commutator, and where
Q̂1 = Q̂⊗ 1 and Q̂2 = 1 ⊗ Q̂ , (7)
and similarly for P̂1 and P̂2, respectively. Relation C (6) discerns the two particles
weakly and categorically. Extensions to pairs of particles of arbitrary spin by means of
spinors proceed straightforwardly.16
We mention that the general proofs do neither rely on the projection postulate of
QM nor on the standard property postulate of QM (a system has a quantitative prop-
erty iff it is in an eigenstate of the corresponding operator), but they do rely on the
uncontroversial conjunct of the last-mentioned (if in an eigenstate, then a property).
In all discernibility-proofs, one begins with the numerical diversity of having N >
1 named particles (N = 2 in the examples above). If one were to account for this
numerical diversity by appealing to the names of the particles only, say, and not to
anything physical about these particles, one would be spreading the smell circularity.
But one does no such thing. The numerical diversity is accounted for physically, that is,
by means of physically meaningful and permutation-invariant relations, as in the two
examples above.
Let us now see how these results bear on OntSR.
4 The Second Underdetermination Thesis
The French-Ladyman argument in favour of OntSR based on QM runs as follows.17
According to QM, an ontology of the truly and uniquely fundamental level of physical
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reality consisting of physical individuals must go, because similar elementary particles
are indiscernible and indiscernibles are not individuals, they are not individual objects.
Then, when you want to be realist with regard to QM (ScR), you better become a onto-
logical structural realist (OntSR). But we have just seen that elementary particles are
weakly discernible, their absolute indiscernibility notwithstanding. We have discernibles
after all. This blocks the inference to OntSR for the scientific realist (ScR) it seems.
More broadly speaking, consider the
Second Under-determination Thesis (2UT). Every scientific theory under-determines ev-
ery specific metaphysical view of that part of the world the theory is about; in other words, every
scientific theory has limited ontological content.18
The adjective ‘specific’ is to rule out trivial metaphysical views, such as ‘There ex-
ists something’, which presumably follows from every scientific theory and therefore
is determined by it.
The on-going debates about the interpretation of QM provide a shining illustration
of 2UT: a variety of distinct metaphysical views of the physical world can be consis-
tently combined with QM. Let us next also consider a thesis opposite to 2UT, saying
that scientific theories do have some ontological content:
Second Determination Thesis (2DT). Scientific theories are incompatible with some spe-
cific metaphysical views; in other words, they do have some definite ontological content.
One illustration of 2DT we have provided in Section 1 on elementary particles: QM
rules out the standard metaphysical view that accompanies classical physics, of space-
time filledwith interacting rigid bodies havingworldlines. We also reported Schro¨dinger’s
conclusion, endorsed by many others, that QM also rules out every metaphysical view
having elementary particles as individuals. This leaves us with an ontological dilemma
between (i) metaphysical views of the world with genuine physical indiscernibles and
(ii) metaphysical views with metaphysical individuals, which are metaphysically abso-
lutely indiscernible objects, each having its own unique ‘token-property’ of haecceitas,
or primitive thisness.19 If we count (i) and (ii) as different metaphysical views, then we
have another illustration with QM of 2UT on our hands. The illustration of 2UT im-
proves whenwe call to mind that we can also take elementary particles to be relationals,
because this adds (iii) a metaphysical view with relationals. We then have an onto-
logical trilemma in the face of QM, of which (i) and (ii) seem to point both to OntSR,
8
but (iii) does not seem to do that. In this sense, then, OntSR seems under-determined
by QM.
Nevertheless, there is a way to infer OntSR, even in the light of the fact that elemen-
tary particles are discernible relationals (iii). This way opens as soon as we call to mind
that structures consist of objects with relations; these objects are determined only in so
far as they are determined by the relations that constitute the structure. As quantum-
mechanical objects, the elementary particles are determined by weakly discerning rela-
tions. Structuralist objects, if they must exist, should be relationals. Well, we have seen
that is exactly what elementary particles demonstrably are: relationals. This leads us
to OntSR. Whatever horn of the mentioned trilemma one chooses, one always ends up
with OntSR. In this sense, 2UT fails. But there is more to be said.
The claim that elementary particles are relationals is not due to some interpreta-
tional gloss spread over the theory of QM, but is a theorem proved on the basis of only
a few postulates of the theory of QM, and exactly the same holds for the claim that
elementary particles are absolute indiscernibles. We are then permitted to deduce that
the theory of QM determines (iii) and rules out (i) the view that elementary particles
are physical indiscernibles. Since view (i) motivates (ii) — a metaphysical property is
postulated in order to save the particles from indiscernibility —, view (ii) is left with-
out motivation, because (i) has been confuted. We conclude that here 2UT fails because
2DT succeeds.
This raises, however, a pertinent question: are properties of elementary particles like
mass, charge and spin-magnitude, determined by relations? This question needs to
be answered in the affirmative by the structural realist (ScEpSR, OntSR), because the
presence of properties in structures is permitted only when they are determined by
relations. The answer is provided by the symmetry-group of QM, which is the Galilei-
group.
The starting point of symmetry considerations is a relation between physical sys-
tems: one system being symmetric to another one, defined as there being a transforma-
tion (a map) that sends one to the other (active transformations); and a relation between
descriptions of one physical system: one description being symmetric to another descrip-
tion of the same system, defined as there being a transformation (a map) that sends one
description to another one (passive transformations). In physics the last-mentioned
usually takes the form of an equation being covariant (form-invariant) under the trans-
formation of the physical magnitudes occurring in the equation. Notice we then have
three relations here (passing over the active symmetry transformation relation): an equa-
tion (which is a relation), the relation of covariance between equations, and physical
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magnitudes being related to transformed physical magnitudes. These transformations
usually form a group. In QM the Galilei transformations form a connected Lie-group,
which consist of the displacements and the rotations (they form the Eulidean group),
and the Galilei-boosts (this can be extended by global phase-transformations of the
state so as to obtain the Bargmann-group). The associated Lie-Algebra generates the
Casimir-invariants, among which we find mass and spin-magnitude. Electric charge
enters when we consider electromagnetic interations. These properties of the physical
system under consideration thus are determined by symmetry relations, which makes
them acceptable for the structural realist.
Hence OntSR is the tailor-made version of scientific realism (ScR) for QM; then
ScEpSR follows due to (1). Optimistic adherents of ScEpR will also be led to OntSR,
due to (2). We conclude that the threat coming from the weak discernibility result has
not only been allayed but it has been philosophically transformed into an argument in
favour of OntSR.20
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Notes
1Weyl [1928: IV.C. § 9], Margenau [1944], Schro¨dinger [1996: 122], French [1989], French & Redhead
[1988], Redhead & Teller [1992], Castellani & Mittelstaedt [2000], French & Ladyman [2003], French
[2006].
2Quine [1976b: 499].
10
3See Redhead [1995].
4See Malament [1996], Halvorson and Clifton [2002].
5We therefore disagree with Chakravartty [2003], who dares to claim that the quantum-physical con-
siderations provide insufficient ground for rejecting a fundamental ontology ofmaterial objects and prop-
erties.
6See their contributions in Castellani [1998].
7Schro¨dinger in Castellani [1998: 203].
8Ladyman [1998], French & Ladyman [2003].
9Other kinds of scientific knowledge are not included here, such as how to conduct an experiment,
how to test an hypothesis, and how to apply knowledge for the benefit of mankind, because they do not
bear on the issue at hand.
10For what unobservables are, see Monton and Van Fraassen [2003], and Muller [2005].
11Worrall [1989], who focussed on 19th-century physics.
12Saunders [2006], Muller & Saunders [2008], Muller & Seevinck [2008].
13Quine [1976a].
14See Muller & Saunders [2008: 503–504] for this terminology.
15For the general proof for N > 1 similar fermions in finite-dimensional Hibert-spaces, see Muller &
Saunders [2008: 535–536].
16For the proof for N > 1 similar particles for arbitrary spin in infinite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces,
see Muller & Seevinck [2008], § 5.
17Ladyman [1998], French & Ladyman [2006].
18The under-determination ofmetaphysics by physics is a running theme in the philosophy of physics,
e.g. § 6 of French [2006]. In harmony with this terminology, the familiar Duhem-Quine thesis about
phenomena and data under-determining theory and model then has to be called ‘the First Under-
determination Thesis’ (1UT).
19Sometimes ‘self-identity’ is taken to express haecceitas. Oject a has haecceitas, abbreviated by h(a),
iff a = a. But since the reflexivity of the identity-relation is an axiom of identity, every object described
in a language that includes predicate logic (of course with identity) has haecceitas. Now it has become
literally logically impossible for an object not to have haecceitas; its possession by everything we care
to quantify over has become a logical necessity. To reject haecceitas, then, is to reject tautologies and to
deny haecceitas is to float in contradictions. This is absurd. Hence ‘self-identity’ is not an acceptable
expression of possessing haecceitas. Perhaps one could, when considering N indiscernibles, introduce
N primitive monadic predicates in one’s language, say P1, P2, . . . , PN , and then adopt the following
axiom: a conjunction of N conjuncts of the form: j = k ←→ Pj(k), where ‘j’ ranges over the predicate-
subscripts and ‘k’ over the set of particles. This implies: j 6= k ←→ ¬Pj(k). Then we can define h(k) as
the disjunction P1(k) ∨ P2(k) ∨ · · · ∨ PN(k), so that every particle has haecceitas. Then every particle
is metaphysically absolutely discernible. Denying haecceitas now has become a logical possibility: reject
the mentioned axiom, or perhaps even better, adopt the following one: ∀ k,∀ j : ¬Pj(k).
20Until now we have been arguing with QM against a Galilean space-time background, which is not
the space-time of our universe. We must move to Minkowskian space-time of the Special Theory of
Relativity, and then to the semi-Riemannian space-time of the General Theory of Relativity. In fact rela-
tivistic quantum field theory — which is what one then ends up with — provides even better grounds
for OntSR than QM. This will have to wait for another occasion.
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